SHIPOWNER OWES DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO PILOT WHO WAS A BUSINESS VISITOR.
MARTIN GOULD, JR. VERSUS M/V GOLDEN DESTINY, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-304 SECTION “N”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5969
April 27, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
On February 6, 1999, plaintiff Martin Gould, Jr., a veteran Mississippi river pilot, guided the oil tanker M/V Golden Destiny from New Orleans, Louisiana to the GATX Refinery in Good Hope, Louisiana. Because Gould did not like the dock access at GATX, he made arrangements for a launch to pick him up from the ship’s ladder on the port side. Gould has brought the instant suit against the owners [*3] of the Golden Destiny, alleging that they negligently caused his ankle injury by failing to properly escort him from the ship when he made a misstep in an unauthorized area of the vessel due to lack of an escort off of the vessel. Defendant claims an escort was offered but turned down by the Plaintiff. The defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that the uncontested facts prove that they were not negligent.
OVERVIEW:
A vessel owner owes a business visitor[*5] like Gould “the duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” Kermarac v. Compagnie Generale TransAtlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632, 3 L. Ed. 2d 550, 79 S. Ct. 406 (1959). Relevant to the case at bar, this duty of care “includes provision for safe means of ingress and egress from the vessel . . .” 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW ß 5-5 (3d ed. 2001).
OUTCOME:
Since the captain admits that he normally escorts pilots from his ship, the Court finds that the issue of whether Gould was offered an escort is material to the question of whether the defendants exercised reasonable care under [*7] the circumstances. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
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COURT GRANTS PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S VENUE TRANSFER AFTER CASE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DISMISSED
MICHAEL GRIVESMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, Defendants.
Case Number: 00 C 2091
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OFILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5257
April 26, 2001, Decided
April 27, 2001, Docketed
OUTCOME:
On January 24, 2001, we dismissed this action for improper venue. We noted in footnote 6 that plaintiffs had not asked for transfer to the federal court in the Southern District of Florida. On March 15, 2001, plaintiffs belatedly did ask for transfer. Given that they are pro se, we treat the motion as one for relief from judgment for mistake or inadvertence pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We vacate the dismissal and transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida.
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ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED ON INJURY TO ANOTHER REQUIRES NEARNESS TO THE ACCIDENT SCENE UNDER MARITME LAW
MARTIN GOULD, JR. VERSUS M/V GOLDEN DESTINY, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-304 SECTION “N”
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5969
April 27, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
In a tort action arising from a diving accident, among the damages sought, plaintiff family members sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff victim was struck by defendant’s boat while diving. He alleged six causes of action and sought monetary damages. Plaintiff victim’s family members also sought damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. These plaintiffs were not with plaintiff victim at the time of the accident. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted regarding the plaintiff family members’ claims. Under federal maritime law, a plaintiff could not recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress for injury sustained by another unless he or she was near the scene of the accident. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that admiralty rules did not apply in this case because of inconsistent Puerto Rican legislation, specifically 12 P.R. Laws Ann. ß 1395(e)(h). This statute dealt with the negligent operation of a vessel by a third party. It did not pertain to a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in an admiralty case.
OUTCOME:
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted.
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TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF PASSENGERS FAILURE TO INFORM DIVE PROGRAM ABOUT ASTHMA CONDITION EVEN THOUGH CASE WENT TO THE JURY ON ISSUE OF VACARIOUS LIABILITY ONLY
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC., Appellant, vs. DIANALEVALLEY, et al., Appellees
CASE NOS. 3D99-232, 3D99-497
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 4753; 26 Fla. L. Weekly D 974
April 11, 2001, Opinion Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Appellant cruise line company challenged a judgment of the Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida, awarding appellees a $660,000 judgment after finding that appellee wife was not comparatively negligent for a diving accident in which she was severely injured.
OVERVIEW:
While appellee wife was on appellant’s cruise she was severely injured during a scuba class conducted under appellant’s auspices. Appellees sued the dive instructor for negligence in failing to adequately instruct or supervise, and appellant, both for its instructor’s negligence and for the failure of other employees to investigate, supervise, and employ competent personnel to conduct the scuba program. Appellees settled their claim against the instructor, and the case went to the jury against appellant specifically based only on its alleged vicarious liability. The jury found in appellees’ favor, but assessed appellee wife’s comparative negligence at 33 percent. The trial judge later found no comparative negligence had been demonstrated, transferred appellee wife’s 33 percent share to appellant, and denied any setoff for the instructor’s settlement. Judgment was reversed. The court concluded a new trial on all liability issues was required because of the trial judge’s peremptory instruction that an asthmatic condition from which appellee wife suffered prior to the dive was not a causative factor in the accident, and his exclusion of proffered expert testimony to the contrary.
OUTCOME:
The judgment against appellant was reversed as to all issues of liability only. Evidence appellee wife concealed her asthmatic condition from the dive instructor and appellant was directly relevant to the issues of the legal causation of her dive accident. It should have been admitted. The same was true of proffered expert testimony that such a condition significantly increased the chances of causing a panicked reaction to a diving mishap.
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FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE ENFORCED AGAINST GREEK SEAMAN EVEN THOUGH TREATED IN LOUISIANA HOSPITAL PRIOR TO DEATH
DIMITRIOS KERAMIDAS VERSUS PROFILE SHIPPING LIMITED AND STEAMSHIP MUTUAL UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION LIMITED, AND GUISE SHIPPING ENTERPRISES CORPORATION
NO. 00-CA-1852
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, FIFTH CIRCUIT
2001 La. App. LEXIS 812
April 11, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiffs, a widow, her minor son, and the executor of the decedent’s estate, brought suit against defendants, a ship owner, an underwriting association, and a shipping enterprise, in the Twenty-ninth Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Charles (Louisiana). The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants and dismissed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment.
OVERVIEW:
The decedent was a Greek seaman who became ill on board a ship that was docked in Louisiana. He died from his illness after being treated in a Louisiana hospital and returned to Greece. Defendants argued that under the forum selection clause in the seaman’s employment agreement, the country of Cyprus, not the United States was the proper forum for the lawsuit. Plaintiffs’ argued that Cyprus was not the proper forum and the forum selection clause was invalid. The appellate court found enforcement of the forum selection clause was reasonable under the facts. Louisiana law did not apply to the maritime forum selection clause because federal law applied instead. Under federal law, the forum selection clause was prima facie valid. Therefore, it had to be enforced because there was no clear showing that enforcement would be unreasonable under the circumstances, unjust, invalid for reason of fraud or overreaching, or would contravene a strong public policy of Louisiana.
OUTCOME:Judgment was affirmed.
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ONE YEAR TICKET LIMITATION FOR FILING SUIT UPHELD AGAINST INJURED PASSENGER
Barbara Tateosian et al. v. Celebrity Cruise Services,Ltd.
No. 99-517-Appeal.
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND
768 A.2d 1248; 2001 R.I. LEXIS 95
April 12, 2001, Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff passengers appealed the judgment of the Superior Court, Kent County (Rhode Island) which granted summary judgment to defendant cruise line and dismissed the negligence action.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff couple purchased two cruise line tickets on defendant’s ship. Attached to their ticket was a contract which limited the time to bring a negligence action to one year and selected the forum. After embarking on their cruise, the wife became sick from food poisoning. Plaintiffs did not file their suit until 18 months after the accident. The ticket contract required suit be brought within one year of the time of injury as allowed by maritime law. The trial court dismissed their action. The appellate court found the contract gave clear notice of the cruise contract terms because the warnings on the embarkation coupons were sufficiently obvious and were emphatically brought to the plaintiffs’ attention. In addition, after receiving notice of the injury, defendant reminded plaintiffs that all rights were reserved including those set out in the cruise ticket contract. Therefore, the contract was fundamentally fair and plaintiffs were bound by its terms.
OUTCOME:
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
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SUMMARY JUDGEMENT FOR SHIPOWNER BASED ON A SEAMAN’S RELEASE REVERSED
JOSEPH ORSINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. O/S SEABROOKE O.N.,614,410 her engines, gear, tackle furniture and appurtenances in rem; SEABROOKE,INC., an Alaska corporation; WILLARD S. FERRIS, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-35588
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7398; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3226
February 15, 2001, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
April 24, 2001, Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the ship and its owners, on his claims for negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and attorneys’ fees.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff injured his right arm and wrist while working aboard a crab-fishing vessel and sued the ship, in rem, as well as the ship’s owner. Plaintiff asserted claims for negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and attorneys’ fees. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that in exchange for cure, earned wages, airfare home, and $500, plaintiff signed an enforceable release that precluded his claims. The court of appeals reversed summary judgment because defendants had not established the enforceability of the release. The appellate court found that the defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the release was executed freely, without deception or coercion and that it was made by the plaintiff with full understanding of his rights. Notably the court of appeals concluded the consideration given for plaintiff’s release was “patently inadequate” because for the $500 he received, he gave up his right to maintenance, unearned wages, and the opportunity to sue for negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under maritime law.
OUTCOME:
The district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants was reversed and remanded where defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that the release was executed freely and the consideration given for plaintiff’s release was “patently inadequate.”
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JUDGEMENT FOR SHIPOWNER REVERSED BASED ON FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFETY MEASURES FOR SEAMAN
JAMES W. PERKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, JUDITH LYNN PERKINS,Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER FUEL SUPPLY, INC.; INDIANA MICHIGAN POWERCOMPANY, INC., RIVER TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 99-4500
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5653; 2001 FED App. 0101P (6th Cir.)
November 29, 2000, Argued
April 6, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff, seamen, appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio entering judgment in favor of defendants, ship owners, after a bench trial on his claims for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. ß 688, and unseaworthiness under general maritime law.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against Defendants alleging that Defendants were liable for negligence under the Jones Act and for the unseaworthiness of Defendants’ vessels under general admiralty law, because the ratchet Plaintiff used was defective and was the cause of his injuries, and that Defendants failed to take adequate safety precautions and provide training for Plaintiff. The district court found that Defendants were not negligent and that the vessels were seaworthy. Plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals reversed-in-part and held that the district court erred in determining that Defendants were not negligent in failing to provide adequate safety measures. The facts indicated that Defendants knew of the risk that the ratchet could fail and that, as result, a seaman could fall from the tow knee and injure himself. Nevertheless, Defendants failed to adequately guard against these risks. Moreover, the appellate court added given that Defendants had installed safety ropes in other areas of their vessel indicated that it would not have been excessively burdensome in light of these risks for Defendants to install safety ropes.
OUTCOME:
The district court’s order was affirmed denying recovery under the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine based on inadequate training, and denying recovery based on the defective ratchet. The order was reversed-in-part and remanded denying recovery under the Jones Act and the unseaworthiness doctrine based on the adequacy of safety measures available on defendants’ vessel.
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UNSEAWORHTINESS JUDGEMENT FOR SEAMAN WHO TRIPPED OVER COAMING IN DOOR WAY THAT DID NOT HAVE A HAND HOLD REVERSED
JAMES A. JACKSON, JR., Plaintiff-Appellee / Cross-Appellant, VERSUS OMI CORPORATION, et al, Defendants, OMI COURIER TRANSPORT, INC., Defendant-Appellant / Cross-Appellee.
No. 00-40173
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
245 F.3d 525; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5601
April 4, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
The United States District Court for Southern District of Texas found defendant vessel owner liable for injuries plaintiff chief steward sustained on the grounds that defendant’s vessel was unseaworthy and that defendant was negligent. Defendant challenged the judgment and allocation of 50 percent contributory negligence to plaintiff. Plaintiff challenged the allocation of contributory negligence.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff was injured when he attempted to pass through a doorway and fell. The trial court had determined that the vessel was unseaworthy for lack of a handhold at the doorway where the accident occurred. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s judgment was clearly erroneous because all of the evidence in the record, including expert testimony about the design of the doorway and plaintiff’s own testimony, pointed to the conclusion that plaintiff simply tripped over the coaming. Thus, the conclusion that the doorway was not reasonably fit and safe for its intended use was clearly erroneous. On the same record, the trial court’s judgment that defendant was negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work was also clearly erroneous.
OUTCOME:
Judgment was reversed and rendered in favor of defendant because trial court’s findings that vessel was unseaworthy and that defendant was negligent were clearly erroneous.
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SEA CAPTAIN RECOVERS $770,190.33 FOR OPERATED HERNIATED DISC PLUS INTEREST
HADWICK STERLING McGUIRE v. ENSCO MARINE COMPANY
CIVIL ACTION NO. G-99-380
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS GALVESTON DIVISION
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5288
April 20, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff, sea captain, sued defendant, marine company and plaintiff’s employer, in a Jones Act and general maritime law action alleging that defendant’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of the vessel on which he was working caused plaintiff to sustain low back and neck injuries. The matter came before the court for a non-jury trial.
OVERVIEW:
Having considered all the pleadings, submissions, and applicable law, the court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment for plaintiff. The court found that the failure to have chafing gear on board, the engineer’s negligently grabbing the wrong lever which caused the towed barge to drift out of control, the failure to conduct a job safety analysis, and the captain’s allowing crew to pull lines using a J-hook instead of the tugger contrary to the safety policy, all contributed to cause plaintiff’s injuries. The lack of non-skid paint on the deck from the wear of the tow cable constituted an unseaworthy condition which contributed to cause plaintiff’s injuries. The court believed plaintiff’s testimony that he was injured when he was helping to connect an emergency tow cable. The medical testimony was that plaintiff suffered a herniated disc, he required surgery, and his injury was permanent. The court entered an award of $770,190.33 plus interest.
OUTCOME:
The court found for plaintiff and entered an award against defendant together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.
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VESSELS SECOND VOYAGE THE DAY AFTER PLAINTIFF’S INJURY NEGATED THE SUGGESTION THAT VESSEL WAS STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS TO PLAINTIFF NOT BEING A SEAMAN
JOSEPH A. LEE v. SEAREX MANUFACTURING, LLC
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-1161 SECTION: “R” (3)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4977
April 12, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Defendant moved for summary judgment against plaintiff’s suit, which asserted claims arising under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. ß 688 and, in the alternative, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.S. ß 905 (b).
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff brought amended suit against defendant insurer, asserting claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. ß 688 and, in the alternative, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.S. ß 905(b). Plaintiff alleged that while working aboard the maritime vessel as a general maintenance worker, he sustained severe injuries to his right ankle when he fell while disembarking from a gangway. Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman and that he was precluded by ß 905(b) from filing suit as a longshoreman against his employer. However, defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied because at the time of the accident, the vessel had completed her sea trials. Furthermore, the vessel embarked on her second voyage and first job assignment the day after plaintiff’s accident, which unequivocally negated the suggestion that the vessel was still under construction. Moreover, whether plaintiff qualified as an ordinary seaman for the purposes of the temporary certificate of inspection was irrelevant to a determination whether plaintiff was a seaman for the purposes of the Jones Act.
OUTCOME:
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
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12. NEGLIGENT ADMINISTRATION OF DRUG TEST THAT RESULTS IN A FALSE POSITIVE RESULTING IN TERMINATION OF SEAMAN’S EMPLOYMENT DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO AN UNSEAWORHTINESS CLAIM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4978
April 11, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff alleged defendant, his former employer, ordered him to take a drug test which resulted in a false positive and led to his termination. He filed a petition for damages under the Jones Act. In response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging a violation of the Shipping Acts and asserting claims of negligence under Louisiana and general maritime law. Defendant moved for summary judgment.
OVERVIEW:
The court construed plaintiff’s amended complaint as an abandonment of his original wrongful discharge claim. Thus, although it may have been moot, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to that claim. Also, the court agreed that the doctrine of seaworthiness did not contemplate plaintiff’s claim that defendant violated its duty to provide medical care when a physician under its direction negligently administered a drug test and caused him to lose his job. Accordingly, the court granted defendant’s motion with respect to plaintiff’s general maritime medical malpractice claim. However, since defendant had not specifically challenged plaintiff’s Louisiana state law medical malpractice claim, that claim survived the motion to dismiss. Because plaintiff was discharged after the voyage began and after one month’s wages were earned, defendant argued that he could not recover under 46 U.S.C.S. ß 10313(c). As plaintiff offered no opposition, the motion to dismiss that claim was granted. Lastly, defendant failed to carry its summary judgment burden with respect to its Labor Management Relations Act preemption argument.
OUTCOME:
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.
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INSURER ADDED TO SEAMAN’S JUDGEMENT
DARYL HENRY v CANDY FLEET CORP., et al.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-1747 c/w 98-2196 SECTION “T” (5)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4966
April 10, 2001, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff seaman filed a motion to amend judgment following a favorable judgment in his admiralty action against defendant corporations for his personal injuries.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff seaman brought an admiralty action against defendant corporations following his personal injuries allegedly caused by defendants. The court entered judgment for plaintiff, awarding him damages. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion to amend judgment, seeking to add defendant insurer as a judgment debtor, seeking admiralty pre-judgment interest, seeking additur, non-admiralty cure past and future medical costs, and seeking to cancel the court’s finding that he caused a small percentage of his own damages. The court granted the motion in part, holding that it was necessary to add defendant insurer as a judgment debtor, and that plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest as there were no peculiar or exceptional circumstances to justify denial of prejudgment interest. The court denied the motion in part, holding that plaintiff failed to show that the court’s damage awards or fault apportionment were erroneous, contained a clear error of law, or would work an injustice upon the parties.
OUTCOME:
Motion was granted in part because defendant insurer was a necessary judgment debtor, and plaintiff seaman was entitled to prejudgment interest. Motion was denied in part because the court’s damage awards and fault apportionment were not in error.
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14. BURDEN OF PROOF ON SHIPOWNER TO PROVE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT SEAMAN DID NOT NEED SURGERY WHERE TWO DOCTORS HAD A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE NEED FOR SURGERY.
LUIGI MALTA versus THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-2047 SECTION “C” (4)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4769
March 30, 2001, Decided; April 2, 2001, Filed; April 3, 2001, Entered
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
Plaintiff was injured while working on a ship owned by defendant. After plaintiff received treatment, defendant’s doctor declared that plaintiff had achieved maximum medical cure. A second doctor recommended a second operation on plaintiff’s knee. Plaintiff sued, seeking maintenance and cure. The case was tried to the court.
OVERVIEW:
Both doctors testified during the bench trial. The court found that both were credible and that they simply had a difference of opinion. Thus, relying on defendant’s burden to prove unequivocally that plaintiff had reached the maximum medical cure, the court found for plaintiff. Plaintiff’s expert testified that he hoped a second surgery on plaintiff’s knee would both alleviate plaintiff’s pain and improve the functioning of plaintiff’s knee. Since the surgery was not to be merely palliative, plaintiff was entitled to receive maintenance and cure.
OUTCOME:
The court found for plaintiff and ordered the parties’ attorneys to attempt to reach settlement on the amount of maintenance and cure to which plaintiff was entitled. Equally strong evidence supported each party’s position; thus, the outcome turned on who bore the burden of proof. The burden, and thus the loss, fell on defendant.
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15. ERROR FOR COURT TO RESTRICT THE ENFORCEMENT OF COST JUDGEMENT AGAINST SEAMAN
SHAUN O’ROURKE, ET AL VERSUS ROWAN COMPANIES, INC., ET AL
Case No. 00-1712
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, THIRD CIRCUIT
2001 La. App. LEXIS 738
April 4, 2001, Rendered
PROCEDURAL POSTURE:
The Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Lafayette (Louisiana) taxed costs against plaintiff British seaman for his dismissed maritime personal injury lawsuit with an order containing language restricting the enforcement of the judgment. Defendant employer was denied supervisory writs and appealed.
OVERVIEW:
Plaintiff British seaman sued defendant employer for a maritime personal injury. Judgment was granted to defendant dismissing all negligence claims with full prejudice and awarding it expert witness and court costs. On plaintiff’s appeal, the award was increased. Defendant moved to set and cumulate all costs into one final judgment. Plaintiff argued that his British social security income was minimal and that defendant’s enforcement of the judgment against his disability benefits should have been prohibited as an arrestment or attachment of his maintenance and cure under 46 U.S.C.S. ß 11109. Judgment against plaintiff was rendered but with restrictive language in his favor per his ß 11109 argument. Defendant appealed. The court amended judgment to be for the ordered amount of $8,748 with no restrictive language, and otherwise affirmed. The district court reached issues not properly before it when it included in its judgment an order prohibiting any court from seizing plaintiff’s benefits and wages under ß 11109. The district court was without jurisdiction to rule on such substantive issues in a limited summary proceeding to set and tax costs. La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2088.
OUTCOME:
The judgment was amended and affirmed.
