Jury Award For Jones Act Seaman Where Employer Left Sick Seaman For Medical Treatment On An Island Without An Airport.

WILLIAM WRIGHT, Plaintiff, – against – MAERSK LINE, LTD.,Defendant.

99 Civ. 11282 (LMM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6359
April 16, 2003, Decided
April 16, 2003, Filed

DISPOSITION:

Prior opinion adhered to on reconsideration. Defendant’s motions for judgment as matter of law or for new trial denied.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff seaman received a jury award against defendant shipping line, with a 50 percent apportionment of fault between the parties. Defendant shipping line filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), or alternatively for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the court’s reduction of the award for future pain and suffering.

OVERVIEW:

Plaintiff filed an action under the Jones Act after plaintiff fell sick during a voyage. Defendant’s master determined that medical treatment was necessary, and plaintiff was transported to the nearest island, which had a hospital facility but no airport. The vessel could have made about a 41-hour trip to another facility that was serviced by an airport. Plaintiff’s medical expert testified that the delay caused by leaving plaintiff at the nearest island affected plaintiff’s medical recovery. Defendant contended in its motion that it fulfilled its duty to plaintiff because it transported plaintiff to the nearest medical facility and the presence or absence of an airport at the destination was not relevant to the inquiry of whether defendant fulfilled its duty. The court held that it was necessary under the facts presented in the case to tell the jury that the presence or absence of an airport was one of the factors that the jury could consider to determine whether defendant was negligent under the Jones Act. The court reconsidered its decision to discount the award for future pain and suffering, a non-pecuniary loss, and determined that such a discount was fair.

OUTCOME:

The court denied defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or alternatively for a new trial. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and upon reconsideration, adhered to the court’s original decision concerning a discount to the judgment.

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Worker Injured Aboard A Grain Transfer Facility Which Was Permanently Moored To A Riverbed And Moved Only On A Winch System Was Not A “Seaman” For Jones Act Purposes.

JAMES MCWATERS VERSUS LEE ENGINEERING SUPPLY CO. & CARGILL, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-3548 SECTION “K” (4)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752
April 7, 2003, Filed, Entered

DISPOSITION:

Defendant Cargill’s Motion for Summary Judgment granted, and plaintiff’s claims against Cargill dismissed with prejudice.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff injured worker sued defendants, his employer and the owner of a midstream grain transfer facility, in Louisiana state court under the Jones Act, general maritime law, the law of unseaworthiness, and the law of maintenance and cure. The facility owner removed the case, and the district court denied the worker’s motion to remand. The owner moved for summary judgment.

OVERVIEW:

The worker was injured while working on board the grain transfer facility. A prior opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held that the facility was not a vessel as a matter of law; a finding that the worker was a seaman with a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation was a prerequisite to maintaining his claims. The district court found that the worker failed to demonstrate that the facts had changed sufficiently since the Fifth Circuit’s opinion so as to alter the facility’s non-vessel status. The facility was permanently moored to the riverbed and was used to transfer grain and other commodities from river barges to oceangoing vessels. It moved back and forth on a winch system, and any transportation function was incidental to the facility’s primary purpose. As the facility was not a vessel as a matter of law, the worker did not have seaman status, and his claims against the facility owner failed.

OUTCOME:

The owner’s summary judgment motion was granted, and the worker’s claims against the owner were dismissed with prejudice.

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Summary Judgment For Jones Act Employer On Cross-Claim From Barge Cleaning Company Denied Where Employee Fell Into An Open Manhole And Genuine Issues Existed As To Whether Jones Act Employer Provided Adequate Training Or A Safe Work Environment.

JACOB RILEY, SR. versus T.T. BARGE CLEANING, INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2531 SECTION “C” (2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5738
April 4, 2003, Decided
April 7, 2003, Filed, Entered

DISPOSITION:

Intervenor/Defendant’s, McKinney Towing, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Cross-Claim asserted by Defendant, T.T. Barge Cleaning, Inc. DENIED.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff employee sued defendant barge cleaning company to recover damages for an accident and injuries allegedly sustained when he fell into an open manhole on a barge at the company’s cleaning facility. The cleaning company filed a cross-claim against the employee’s Jones Act employer. The employer moved for summary judgment dismissing the cross-claim.

OVERVIEW:

It was undisputed that in general the employer’s crew bore no responsibility for closing manhole covers on the barge cleaning company’s vessels. However, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the employer failed to take reasonable measures to provide the employee with a safe work environment and to adequately train him to avoid non-daylight work hazards.

OUTCOME:

The employer’s summary judgment motion to dismiss the cross-claim was denied.