October 2006 Issue

Passenger’s Claims Against Cruise Line Corporation Were Barred Because He Had Signed Release That Discharged Corporation From Liability In Connection With Use Of Jet Ski, But Passenger’s Son Was Not Bound By Release Because He Was A Minor. Son’s Unseaworthiness Claims Were Dismissed Because The Doctrine Did Not Extend To A Ship’s Passengers.

IN RE: THE COMPLAINT OF ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., as owner of the
unnamed 2003 Yamaha Wave Runner XL700, 80HP Vessel, Serial Number
YAMA2794I203, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, MIAMI DIVISION
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77646
October 23, 2006, Decided

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Petitioner, a cruise line corporation, sued claimants, a passenger and his son, to adjudicate a claim for exoneration. Claimants had suffered personal injuries when the jet ski they were using during an ocean tour collided with an island. Claimants filed claims against the corporation, which contended that it was not liable for claimants’ injuries because claimants had signed a release agreement. The corporation moved for summary judgment.

OVERVIEW:

The release stated that claimants agreed to fully discharge the corporation from any and all liability for any injuries they sustained when using the jet ski. The court held that (1) the release was valid as against the passenger’s claims because the release was clear and unambiguous, and the fact that the tour leader may have led the tour in a way that violated the safety rules outlined in the release did not void the release; (2) the release was not valid as against the son’s claims because he was a minor at the time of the accident, and the passenger’s signing of the release did not equate to a release of the son’s claims; (3) the doctrine of unseaworthiness was limited to seaman and did not extend to a ship’s passengers, and thus, the son’s claims of unseaworthiness had to be dismissed; (4) the remaining claims in the suit, which were the son’s claims, sounded in negligence; and (5) the son could not support his negligence claims by alleging that the corporation violated Florida statutory law because this suit was a maritime personal injury action that was governed by substantive general maritime law.

OUTCOME:

The court denied in part and granted in part the motion for summary judgment. The motion was granted as to the passenger’s claims and denied as to the son’s claims. A negligence standard was to govern the case, and therefore, the son could not bring a claim under the doctrines of unseaworthiness or ultrahazardous/strict liability. The son was also prohibited from referencing Florida statutory law to serve as a basis for the negligence claims.

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Under The Limitation Of Liability Act, A Cruise Ship Line Is Exonerated From Liability For Injuries Incurred By Minors Who Rented A Jet Ski For A Guided Tour Of An Ocean Bay; The Minors Were Reasonably Warned Of The Jet Ski’s 300-Foot Braking Distance By A Video, A Trained Guide’s Demonstration, And Printed Warnings.

IN RE: THE COMPLAINT OF ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD., as owner of the
unnamed 2003 Yamaha Wave Runner XL700, 80HP Vessel, Serial Number
YAMA27941203, for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, MIAMI DIVISION
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77643
October 23, 2006, Decided

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Petitioner cruise line filed an exoneration action under the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app.§§ 181-188, after claimants, minors who were cruise passengers, sought damages for personal injuries incurred when the jet ski they had rented from the cruise line crashed into an island during a guided tour of an ocean bay in the Bahamas. Claimants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the cruise line opposed.

OVERVIEW:

Claimants alleged that the cruise line was negligent because if failed to follow the operating manual procedures for the jet ski in question and failed to train claimants on the jet ski’s off-throttle steering loss and lack of brakes. Under the Act’s burden-shifting analysis, the court found that the cruise line was not negligent. Inter alia, before permitting claimants to rent the jet ski, the cruise line required them to view an operational video, watch a trained tour guide’s demonstration of riding the same model jet ski, and participate in a test run to make sure they understood that the jet ski could glide up to 300 feet when stopping. Claimants had signed a waiver and release form that specifically stated that the jet ski lacked brakes and had a 300-foot stopping radius. Additionally, a warning about the lack of brakes was affixed to the jet ski itself. Under the circumstances, the cruise line exercised reasonable care. Claimants also failed to show that the jet ski was unseaworthy if properly operated. A defense expert’s testimony that jet skis using off-throttle steering loss systems were defective was not intended as a legal or scientific conclusion.

OUTCOME:

The court denied claimants’ motion for summary judgment.

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A Tanker’s Owner And Operator Were Not Entitled To Summary Judgment On A Claim For Negligence Under The Jones Act Because There Were Genuine Issues Of Fact As To Whether The Duty To Provide A Reasonably Safe Workplace Required Installation Of Lights Inside A Tank And Whether The Lack Of Lighting Played A Part In Causing A Chief Mate’s Injuries.

KIMBERLY BORGES -v- SEABULK INTERNATIONAL, INC. f/k/a HVIDE MARINE INC.,
INTEROCEAN MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and THE SS HMI DIAMONDS SHOALS,
In Rem
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74928
October 17, 2006, Decided

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff chief mate filed an action against defendants, the owner and the operator of a product tanker, asserting claims for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 688, unseaworthiness of the vessel, maintenance and cure, and punitive damages. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the negligence and unseaworthiness claims.

OVERVIEW:

The chief mate was the second in command on defendants’ vessel. While conducting an inspection of a ballast tank, the chief mate fell into a lightening hole, breaking several ribs. The chief mate alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to provide intrinsically safe drop lights inside the ballast tank, that such drop lights were provided to defendants’ sister vessels, that the chief mate probably would not have fallen in a lightening hole if the drop lights had been available, that no other drop lights could be used aboard product tankers, and that she had made complaints to the captain on multiple occasions regarding the lack of lights. With respect to the negligence claim, the court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants’ duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace required installation of lights inside the tank and whether the lack of lighting played a part in causing the chief mate’s injuries. Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the unseaworthiness claim because a reasonable jury could find that the vessel was rendered unseaworthy by the lack of lights in the tank.

OUTCOME:

The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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Court Had Jurisdiction To Consider Claims Of Seaman, Who Was Citizen Of Republic Of Honduras, For Relief Under Laws Of Honduras, Mexico, Or International Maritime Law. The Plain Language Of The Jones Act Denied Remedy Under Jones Act And Us Maritime Laws But Did Not Refer To Jurisdiction Of A Federal Court Over Claims Under Foreign Laws.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff seaman filed an action against defendant, alleging negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 688, and unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. Defendant moved for summary judgment.

OVERVIEW:

The seaman was a citizen of the Republic of Honduras. Both the seaman’s employer and the owner of the vessel were subsidiaries of defendant. Defendant contended that § 688(b) denied a foreign seaman the right to sue in a federal or state court of the United States. The seaman argued that § 688(b) did not deprive him of access to courts in the United States to present claims for his injury under the laws of Honduras and Mexico. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to consider the seaman’s claims for relief under the laws of Honduras, Mexico, or international lex maritime. The plain language of § 688(b)(1) denied the seaman a remedy under the Jones Act and the maritime laws of the United States; however, the statute did not refer to the jurisdiction of a federal court over a seaman’s claims under foreign laws. Accordingly, defendant did not establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the foreign law claims were barred under § 688.

OUTCOME:

The motion for summary judgment was denied.

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Cruise Line’s Petition For A Writ Of Prohibition Was Granted Because A Florida Court Was Without Authority To Reinstate A Passenger’s Action After A Federal Court Dismissed The Action Due To The Passenger Having Failed To File Her Personal Injury Action In The Federal Court Within One Year As Prescribed In The Passenger’s Ticket-Contract Provision.

CARNIVAL CORPORATION d/b/a CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, Petitioner, vs. BARBARA
MIDDLETON and JAMES MIDDLETON, her husband, Respondents.
COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT
2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 16421; 31 Fla. L. Weekly D 2480
October 4, 2006, Opinion Filed

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Respondent passenger sued petitioner cruise line in a Florida court for personal injuries in a negligence action. The judge dismissed the action without prejudice. The passenger then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The federal judge dismissed the action. The Florida court then reinstated the action. The cruise line filed an appeal which was interpreted as a petition for a writ of prohibition.

OVERVIEW:

Based on a forum selection clause in the passenger’s ticket, which provided for the resolution of any dispute to be litigated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami, the lower court dismissed the action. After the passenger filed suit in the federal court, the federal court dismissed the federal action on grounds that the passenger failed to file suit in federal court within the applicable ticket-contract provision of one year for personal injury actions. The passenger, upon reinstatement of the action in the lower court, argued that the venue provision in the passenger ticket was unenforceable. The reviewing court found that the federal court’s findings regarding forum selection and limitations grounds were binding upon the lower court under the principles of collateral estoppel. Further, res judicata barred the trial court from re-litigating the waiver question of the right to trial by jury under Fla. Const. art. I, § 22. Moreover, the dismissal based on statute of limitations grounds constituted an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. Therefore, the lower court was without authority to reinstate the cause of action.

OUTCOME:

The petition for a writ of prohibition was granted.

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Court Refused To Enforce Choice Of Forum Clause In Employment Contract Between American Seaman And American Employer In The Seaman’s Jones Act Claim Because The Factors Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404(A) Weighed Slightly In Favor Of Seaman’s Choice Of Forum In That Employer Regularly Conducted Business In District And The Wrong Allegedly Occurred There.

DERRICK J. PARFAIT, SR., Plaintiff, v. CENAC TOWING, INC., Defendant.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, GALVESTON DIVISION
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77046
October 19, 2006, Decided

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff, an American seaman, brought an action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 688, against defendant, an American employer, for personal injuries allegedly occurring while the seaman was working aboard one of the employer’s vessels. The employer filed an opposed motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404(a) and an alternate motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).

OVERVIEW:

The seaman was required to sign a choice of forum agreement as a condition of employment, which prohibited the seaman from filing a personal injury suit against the employer in a court outside of Louisiana. The court denied the motions. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:921(A)(2), making choice of forum clauses in employment contracts unenforceable, showed a strong public policy against enforcing such clauses. The employer offered no persuasive argument to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) based on the clause or to abandon the court’s earlier decision holding the choice of forum agreements between American seamen and American companies were unenforceable in Jones Act claims. Though the scales were fairly even, the court found that the factors for transferring venue weighed slightly in favor of retention of the case under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404(a) even though the seaman did not reside in the district. The case had a connection to the forum in that the employer regularly conducted business within the district, the wrong allegedly occurred in the district, and the seaman chose the forum. The employer failed to provide sufficient evidence to show inconvenience to key witnesses.

OUTCOME:

The court denied the employer’s motion to transfer venue and alternate motion to dismiss.

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An Injunction Was Vacated As The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Dissolve An Injunction It Had Issued Under The Limitation Of Liability Act; The District Court Rested Its Decision On An Error Of Law That Since The Saving To Suitors Clause Did Not Apply, An Allegedly Injured Seaman Was Not Entitled To Proceed In His Chosen Forum.

INLAND DREDGING, In the Matter of the Complaint of Inland Dredging Company,
LLC, Owner and Operator of the M/V Ms Paula, for Exoneration from Limitation or
Liability, Plaintiff-Appellee v. RICARDO SANCHEZ, Claimant-Appellant
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26899
October 27, 2006, Filed

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Appellee dredging company filed a limitation of liability action pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C.S. app. § 185, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi and obtained an injunction. Appellant allegedly injured seaman appealed the injunction, which prevented him from proceeding with his Jones Act case against the dredging company in another federal district court.

OVERVIEW:

The seaman contended that as a single claimant who had filed a stipulation that protected the shipowner’s rights to limitation of liability, he should be allowed to proceed with his claims in his chosen forum. The dredging company argued that since the seaman pursued remedies in a federal court sitting in admiralty, rather than a common law state court, he was restricted to litigating all issues before the current federal district court. The appellate court did not find anything in the Limitation Act’s text, legislative history, or United States Supreme Court’s opinions that led it to conclude that only where the Limitation Act and the saving to suitors clause conflict was it appropriate for the limitation court to dissolve its injunction and allow the claimant to proceed in a different forum. To allow the district court to continue to restrain the seaman from pursuing his case in another federal district court would turn the Limitations Act into an offensive instrument to cut off his traditional right to choose his forum.

OUTCOME:

The injunction was vacated.