Because claimant’s complaint alleging catastrophic and permanent injuries raised at least a reasonable possibility that his claim might exceed the value of the vessel, it was the vessel owner’s responsibility to conduct an investigation, and to file a Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30501 et seq., action within six months.

In re: ECKSTEIN MARINE SERVICE L.L.C., In Re: In the Matter of the Complaint of Eckstein Marine Service L.L.C. now known as Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland L.L.C. as owner/operator of the M/V St. Andrew for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability; ECKSTEIN MARINE SERVICE L.L.C., now known as Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland L.L.C.; MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY GULF-INLAND L.L.C., Plaintiffs — Appellants v. LORNE JACKSON, Claimant — Appellee
No. 10-20600

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
672 F.3d 310; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3480

February 22, 2012, Filed

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Appellant vessel owner appealed from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, dismissing its Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30501 et seq., limitation action as untimely.

OVERVIEW:

The district court’s admiralty jurisdiction could not, in and of itself, give the district court subject matter jurisdiction over any part of the litigation (appellee claimant chose to file his complaint in state court); only the vessel owner’s complaint under the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30501 et seq., was properly before the district court, which required the vessel owner to follow the Act’s mandatory filing deadline. The claimant was under no obligation to specify an amount claimed in his initial state court complaint, and never asserted that the damages he sought were less than $750,000. Because his complaint alleging catastrophic and permanent injuries raised at least a reasonable possibility that his claim might exceed the value of the vessel, it was the vessel owner’s responsibility to conduct an investigation, and to file a limitation action within six months if it wanted to avail itself of that statute’s generous protection. The district court did not err in concluding that the six-month deadline was triggered when the claimant delivered his complaint to the vessel owner, and that the vessel owner’s petition was untimely filed.

OUTCOME:

The judgment of the district court was affirmed

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District court erred in dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an alleged seaman’s negligence action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104, because the complaint provided an adequate basis to invoke the Jones Act and thus to require the district court to exercise federal jurisdiction over the case.

TIMOTHY WAYNE HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAGAN RIVER DOCKSIDE SEAFOOD, INCORPORATED; JOSEPH L. MELZER, JR., Defendants-Appellees.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
669 F.3d 448; 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3897

February 27, 2012, Decided

PROCEDURAL POSTURE:

Plaintiff challenged a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his negligence action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104, against defendants, a boat owner and its chief operating officer.

OVERVIEW:

Plaintiff alleged that he was a seaman employed by defendants under an oral contract. He allegedly “leased” a boat from defendants, who then paid him for his catch of oysters or crabs, deducting a “fee” from the proceeds for use of the vessel. He alleged that he was injured in the course of his employment when a conveyor belt moved and trapped his hand. He claimed that the conveyor belt was improperly secured and that his injury was a result of defendants’ negligence. The district court concluded that plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated that (1) he was a seaman and (2) his injury occurred during the course of his employment as a seaman. On appeal, the court held that the allegations contained in plaintiff’s complaint provided an adequate basis to invoke the Jones Act and thus to require the district court to exercise federal jurisdiction over the case. The fact-intensive nature of the remaining issues necessitated the further development of the record and the application of procedures other than those in Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

OUTCOME:

The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings